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Since 1989, the evolving security environment has been a key concern for the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).  The future 
security environment is difficult to forecast because of problems such as demographic 
imbalances, environmental and social change, and the tensions between prosperous and 
developing nations.  The increasing interdependence and multiple interactions among 
nations mean that few nations or political groups can be completely isolated from 
evolving crisis situations.  Future conflicts among nations are likely when they compete 
for economic advantage and access to limited resources. 
NATO and the EU have to realize that flexible military forces must be available 
to meet evolving security challenges.  The most adaptable forces capable of responding 
on short notice to these likely scenarios are maritime forces.  For this reason, naval 
organizations such as the Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe 
(STRIKFORSOUTH), the Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED), 
and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), as well as the concept of an 
European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF), are among the assets that must be 
earmarked to meet emerging security threats. 
 This thesis analyzes post-1989 organizational and capability adaptations of 
NATO and European naval command organizations.  Specifically, this thesis examines 
how the adaptations of the Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe 
(STRIKFORSOUTH), the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), and the 
Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED), as well as the definition of the 
 xii
European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF) concept, strengthen the European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO and endow the European Union 
(EU) with a naval dimension.  These organizational adaptations are intended to help the 
member nations of NATO and the EU meet evolving international security challenges.  
However, they have also raised significant questions about whether NATO European 
allies are willing to fund NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to address 
military and naval deficiencies.  The capabilities gap between the naval forces of the 
United States and those of NATO European allies poses noteworthy challenges, including 
interoperability.            
NATO remains relevant today because its members work together to bring their 
combined energy to bear in shaping the European security environment.  These naval 
organizational and conceptual adaptations, including those made within the framework of 
ESDI, are intended to strengthen NATO and the EU and to enhance their ability to act 
within the immediate European area and beyond.  These naval organizations and 
concepts must continue to develop mutually supportive and complementary capabilities 
while adapting to the changing international security environment in order to sustain the 
West’s naval superiority.  
 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
A.  DESCRIPTION OF THESIS 
This thesis analyzes the organizational and capability adaptations to the changing 
operational requirements of NATO and European naval command organizations since 
1989.  It identifies the naval command organizations of interest and examines their 
adaptations to the changing international security environment.  The key questions 
include:  What advantages do these organizational and capability adaptations offer the 
United States and the other NATO allies?  What implications do these adaptations have 
for United States naval forces in Europe?  What further adaptations in these organizations 
may be required? 
B.  BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the primary 
defense structure for its members on both sides of the Atlantic.  NATO’s maritime 
component evolved during the Cold War to joint warfighting levels not previously 
matched.  With the end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in the international 
security environment, NATO allies had to adapt their military policies and postures. 
In the early 1990s, the European Union (EU) expanded its involvement in the 
political-military realm with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was 
established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1991.  As the Council of Ministers of the Western 
European Union (WEU) noted, the Maastricht Treaty called for the WEU to “be 
developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen 
2 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”1  In the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, the 
WEU Council of Ministers indicated that “military units of WEU member states, acting 
under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking.”2   
The EU summit meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 specified targets that the 
EU countries should aim for in terms of military capabilities.  The agreed on “headline 
goal” was to be established by 2003 and forces were to be: 
able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of 
Petersberg tasks including the most demanding, in operations up to corps 
level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000 – 60,000 persons)…forces should be 
militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and 
intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and 
additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.  Member States should 
be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to 
provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very 
high readiness.  They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least 
one year.  3   
Additionally, the “headline goal” called for development and coordination of 
monitoring and early warning systems, an increased number of readily deployable forces, 
enhanced strategic sea lift capabilities, establish a European air transport command, and 
new permanent political-military bodies within the European Council.  The “headline 
                                                 
1 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Maastricht, December 10, 1991.  “Maastricht 
Declaration,” Introduction, par 2, “The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the 
European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.” 
2 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, June 19,1992, “Petersberg Declaration,” par.4 
of Part II, “On Strengthening WEU’s Operational Role,” quoted in David Yost, NATO Transformed 
(Washington, DC: United States Information Press, 1998), p. 209.  
3 European Union Presidency Conclusion, Helsinki 10 and 11 December 1999, Available [Online]:  
http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm, Annex IV. 
3 
goal” calls for many ground force improvements but references to naval improvement 
requirements have been minimal, to say the least.    
These declarations, which reflect a continued desire on the part of the EU states to 
reduce their reliance on the United States and assume greater responsibility for regional 
defense and security, have not yet come fully to fruition.  Since 1992 NATO European 
nations have cut their defense budgets by 22 percent in real terms.4  For these reasons, the 
strength of the ESDP proposals have been undermined; and it is unlikely to be 
substantially improved in the near future.  With the political leaders of the EU calling for 
improved military forces but unlikely to obtain all the capabilities required to comply with 
their stated “headline goal” to be fulfilled by 2003, the United States and NATO are 
needed to fill the void.  This is particularly true with regard to naval capabilities because 
the need for naval forces is increasing and the EU’s declared goals give little attention to 
naval capabilities. 
Collective defense remains at the core of the NATO commitments of the United 
States and the other allies.  However, their security activities now range across much 
wider areas of interests that involve multinational forces on a local or regional scale.  With 
lower force levels, decreased funding, and continuing commitments regarding regional 
and “out of area” security, the United States and its Allies have to be ready to work 
together with lighter and smaller naval forces.  Future naval forces will have to be more 
mobile, flexible, and diverse to meet emergent challenges that are different in scope than 
previously experienced.  NATO forces led by the United States will need to have multi-
                                                 
4 “The NATO Capability Gap,” in Strategic Survey 1999/2000 (London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, May 2000). pp 19-20.   
4 
purpose characteristics to be more flexible in all situations.  The versatility of maritime 
forces allows for more freedom from national borders.  If properly organized, trained, and 
supported, naval forces can function as multinational military assets ready for action.   
Maritime forces are able to perform short-notice taskings and are fully capable of 
responding to Article 5 and non-Article 5 situations.  Article 5 situations were defined in 
the Washington Treaty of 1949 that established the Atlantic Alliance.  All parties agreed 
that:  
an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree 
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right 
of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by 
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore 
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.5 
 
Non-Article 5 situations do not involve collective self-defense but rather crisis 
situations analogous to the Western European Union’s Petersberg Tasks, adopted by the 
European Union in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.  
NATO’s traditional orientation regarding collective defense as its sole military 
function has changed since 1989.  The crisis management tasks defined by the April 1999 
NATO Strategic Concept are prominent among the Alliance’s principal new roles.  Naval 
forces are earmarked as key instruments for present and future operational requirements.  
For this reason, naval organizations within NATO and Europe such as the European 
Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), the Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean 
                                                 
5 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, Available [Online]: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty/htm.  
5 
(CAFMED), the European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF), and above all the 
Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH) have to 
continue to adapt to present and future operational demands and “crisis situations.”  
Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (SNFL) and Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean 
(SNFM) have also had to adapt from their Cold War mindset to fulfill present and future 
operational demands.   
NATO’s maritime component was originally designed for Article 5 operations—
that is, defense against aggression by powers such as the Soviet Union and its Warsaw 
Pact allies.  The post-Cold War world since 1989 has been defined primarily by non-
Article 5 situations.  For this reason, NATO and European naval forces have had to adapt 
to meet non-Article 5 crisis response challenges.  Improvements in power projection and 
increased interoperability are needed for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 purposes.  With 
this in mind, the new STRIKFORSOUTH as part of the NATO structure is to be prepared: 
To conduct maritime striking and multinational amphibious/expeditionary 
operations and to support and/or reinforce both inter/intra-regionally.  
COMSTRIKFORSOUTH is also to contribute to the preservation of peace 
and the promotion of stability through cooperation and dialogue, participate 
in crisis management and be prepared to plan and execute, or provide 
support for, expanded roles and missions, as assigned by CINCSOUTH. 6 
 
If STRIKFORSOUTH is to be capable of performing its potential and probable 
missions, its capabilities will have to be improved.  This will require the will and 
commitment of the member countries:  Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  These nations must provide the 
money and resources necessary to build and maintain the military forces needed.  The 
                                                 
6 STRIKFORSOUTH Operational Concept Brief, 11 July 2000. 
6 
non-Article 5 challenges faced by STRIKFORSOUTH may be less predictable than the 
Cold War situations NATO had previously prepared for.  The new situations may call for 
naval power projection, rapid reaction naval forces, naval deterrence forces, and joint or 
combined actions.  The need to be able to respond to emergent challenges effectively has 
not changed and will not change in the future for naval forces.  The implementation of 
STRIKFORSOUTH improvement plans will strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.  Many of 
the adaptations taking place in STRIKFORSOUTH need in varying degrees to be pursued 
within the framework of European naval organizations. 
Naval command organizations such as EUROMARFOR, CAFMED, and EMMF 
are intended to be made available for WEU and future EU-led operations and to be used 
within the framework of the “Petersberg Tasks” to accelerate and coordinate responses to 
potential crisis situations.  The EU is calling for improvements in naval capabilities, but 
the EU’s member nations are unlikely to make those improvements soon.  NATO and 
European naval organizations have to adapt to the changing international secur ity 
environment, and make corresponding improvements and adaptations in their capabilities.   
The NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative goals are to “ensure that all Allies not 
only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face 
the new security challenges.”7  For these initiatives to get positive results, the United 
States has to take the lead and remain involved.  According to Walter Slocombe, then the 
U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,    
                                                 
 
7 NATO factsheet, “NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative”, Available [Online]: 
http://www.nato.int/isn-lase.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/cristallina/ConvertDocCGI_cristallina.  
7 
The U.S. will remain fully engaged in European security issues, so neither 
politically nor militarily is there any question of Europe needing to prepare 
for a U.S. withdrawal from Europe.  Indeed, it is overwhelmingly likely 
that in any situation where involvement of military forces is justified and 
where NATO is prepared to authorize a military operation, the U.S. will be 
part of the operation. 8  
 
C.  ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis analyzes the evolving role in European and “out of area” contingencies 
of STRIKFORSOUTH, EMMF, EUROMARFOR, CAFMED, SNFL, and SNFM and 
examine the implications for NATO and the U.S. Navy.  Chapter 1 provides a general 
introduction to the topic and an explanation of its importance.  It also discusses the 
methodology:  this thesis is based on a qualitative analysis of scholarly and journalistic 
sources, including primary and secondary sources.  Chapter 2 reviews the organizational 
and capability adaptations within NATO and more limited multinational naval 
organizations under NATO auspices or involving NATO European allies since 1989.  It 
also considers how the EU and the WEU have adapted to changing requirements within 
their own more limited multinational naval organizations since 1989.  Chapter 3 discusses 
the adaptations to the changing security environment and how they affect the Alliance.  It 
also examines potential future adaptation requirements, given the external security 
environment and the dynamics within the Alliance.  Chapter 4 examines how the 
adaptations within the Alliance’s naval organizations since 1989 affect the United States, 
NATO, and the EU.      
 
                                                 
8 Slocombe, remarks to the Atlantic Council, 14 June 1996, p. 4, quoted in David Yost, NATO 
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9 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL AND CAPABILITY ADAPTATIONS 
 
 
Since the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 some of the crises in the  Euro-
Atlantic region have been dealt with by multinational forces under the auspices of the 
United Nations and/or other regional security and political organizations such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and the 
European Union (EU).  As the world’s population continues to grow, environmental and 
economic stresses will contribute to competition over natural resources, including the 
oceans and seas.9  This competition, coupled with increased threats of terrorism, religious 
persecution, ethnic rivalries, mass migration, and nationalism, will increase the need for 
more flexible, mobile, and capable military forces that are unhindered by national borders.   
No area in the world is more susceptible to these factors of conflict than Europe’s 
new strategic “arc of crisis.”  This arc runs from North Africa and the Mediterranean into 
the Middle East and Southwest Asia.10  Maritime forces offer the versatile and multi-
purpose characteristics that can meet the diverse emergent challenges of those regions. 
Naval forces also must maintain the ability to carry out traditional roles such as 
projecting power to maintain political influence, and protecting sea- lanes for economic 
prosperity and communication. 
                                                 
9 James O. Ellis Jr., “Traditional Naval Roles ,” in Richard H. Shultz and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds., 
The Role of Naval Forces in 21st-Century Operations  (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), p. 141. 
10 Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Ian O. Lesser.  “Mediterranean Security: New 
Challenges, New Tasks,” NATO Review.  vol. 44, no. 3 (May 1996), Available [Online]: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9603-6.htm.    
10 
Since 1949, NATO has been the primary defense structure for its members on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  American naval forces, in cooperation with other NATO maritime 
forces, have become the primary guarantors of political and military stability in the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean regions.  In the post-Cold War era, NATO navies have 
provided naval warfighting power to promote peace, stability, and economic growth 
throughout the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions.  Given rising demands for naval forces 
in troubled regions outside the traditional NATO area of operations, the NATO allies must 
continue to adapt their military structures, policies, and postures. 
A.  WEU HISTORY THROUGH THE COLD WAR 
The Brussels Treaty, signed in 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, furnished the basis for the WEU, which was 
established in 1954 as part of the modified Brussels Treaty.  A response to the Soviet 
Union’s establishment of Communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe after World War II, 
the Brussels Treaty was signed to help Western European countries pursue collective self-
defense.  Western European countries realized that a commitment to mutual defense 
against armed attack was paramount.  The Brussels Treaty reflected their initial 
commitment to collective defense, but they realized that they needed more defensive 
capability to balance and deter the Soviet Union.  An advance in collective defense came 
with the Washington Treaty of 1949, which created NATO.  The countries joining the five 
signers of the 1948 Brussels Treaty in the Washington Treaty were Canada, Denmark, 
Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United States.  The Washington Treaty brought 
the United States into collective defense commitments in Europe and made NATO the 
primary defensive structure in Europe.   
11 
From 1954 to 1984, while NATO served as the principal Allied defense 
organization in Europe, the WEU promoted the importance of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and stressed political development, closer cooperation with other European 
organizations, and unity among its member nations: Belgium, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom.   The 
WEU had no military structures or forces under its sole direction because the member 
nations explicitly assigned all military defense responsibilities to NATO under the 
authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).11 
In 1984, the WEU began to redefine and expand its role.  Its members met to 
discuss the concept of a West European security identity and the gradual linking of 
defense policies among member nations outside NATO.  The member country foreign and 
defense ministers realized that common defense and the security of Europe needed more 
emphasis and planning so they created the framework outlined in the Rome Declaration. 12  
The Rome Declaration brought to the forefront the issue of the WEU considering the  
implications for Europe of crises in other regions and the possibility of strengthening the  
Atlantic Alliance through European contributions.  The WEU defense and foreign 
ministers continued to seek harmonization among themselves in the fields of defense, 
arms control and disarmament, East-West security relations, and the further development 
of political cooperation among member nations.  They stressed the need for security 
                                                 
11 Western European Union, Nine-Power Conference, Final Act Chapter IV, October 3, 1954.  
Available [Online]: http://www.weu.int/eng/docu/d431003a.htm.     
12 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Rome Declaration, October 27, 1984.   Available 
[Online]: http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/84-rome.htm.   
12 
within the Atlantic Alliance and recommitted themselves to discussing defense matters 
within the WEU Assembly. 13     
B.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEU AS THE DEFENSE ARM OF THE EU    
External security issues were never among the EU’s original goals because NATO 
was the principal means by which most EU members assured their defense and security.  
In the early 1990s, however, the EU expanded its involvement in the political-military 
realm with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was established by the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1991.  Trying to bolster its political position on the world stage and 
to gain a military role commensurate with its position in the world economic market, the 
EU referred to the independently established institution, the WEU.   
As the Council of Ministers of the WEU noted in 1991, the Maastricht Treaty 
called for the “WEU to be developed as the defense component of the EU and as a means 
to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”14  In the 1992 Petersberg 
Declaration, the WEU Council of Ministers indicated that “military units of the WEU 
member states, acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for:  humanitarian 
and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking.”15  Furthering the EU’s expanding role in building a common 
European security and defense policy, these “Petersberg Tasks” were incorporated into the 
                                                 
13 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Rome Declaration, October 27, 1984. “Rome 
Declaration,” Par 8, WEU Council of Ministers Rome Declaration. Available [Online]: 
http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/84-rome.htm.   
14 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Maastricht, December 10, 1991.  “Maastricht 
Declaration,”Par 2 of Part II, The Role of the Western European Union with the European Union and the 
Atlantic Alliance.” 
15 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, June 19,1992, “Petersberg Declaration,” par.4 
of Part II, “On Strengthening WEU’s Operational Role,” quoted in David Yost, NATO Transformed 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p.209. 
13 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty under the new Article 17 (formerly Article J.7), which also 
opened up the prospect of a common defense and potential integration of the WEU into 
the EU.16   
The WEU and its relations with NATO were considered the backbone of the new 
European Security and Defense Identity until late 1998, when British policy changes 
initiated a new phase in the pursuit of the European Security and Defense Policy, ESDP.  
This remarkable change in British policy toward a common defense and security policy 
took place at St. Malo in December 1998 during the British-French summit where it was 
decided that:  
To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and 
the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.17   
 
While previous attempts at developing an ESDP had been unsuccessful, agreement 
between France and Britain, traditionally opposite in their thinking on defense matters, 
brought hope and promise to achieving the initiative’s objectives.  Recognizing the EU’s 
inability to handle crises such as those in the Balkans, the EU member states declared their 
intention at subsequent summit meetings to reinforce the CFSP by developing their own 
collective military capability to respond to international crisis situations.     
                                                 
 
16 European Union, Treaty on European Union, 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, Article 17 (ex Article J.7).  
Available [Online]: http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf.     
17 Joint Declaration on European Defense, St. Malo, France 3-4 December 1998.  Available [Online]: 
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The EU summit meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 specified targets that the 
EU countries should aim for in terms of military capabilities.  The EU agreed on a 
“headline goal,” to be achieved by 2003, and called for an ability: 
to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of 
Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most 
demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000 – 
60,000 persons).  These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the 
necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other 
combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval 
elements.  Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level 
within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements 
available and deployable at very high readiness.  They must be able to 
sustain such a deployment for at least one year.18   
 
Additionally, the EU summit meeting at Helsinki also called for development and 
coordination of monitoring and early warning systems, an increased number of readily 
deployable forces, enhanced strategic sea lift capabilities, establishment of a European air 
transport command, and new permanent political-military bodies under the European 
Council.  These new bodies will be the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the 
Military Committee of the European Union, and the Military Staff of the European Union.   
The EU summit meeting in Nice solidified these new bodies by deciding to place them on 
a permanent basis.19   
These new permanent political-military bodies were created to enable “the EU to 
assume its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management 
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tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg Tasks.”20  The PSC will deal with all 
matters falling within the CFSP, help define policies, and provide guidance for all other 
EU political-military bodies.21  The European Union Military Committee “is responsible 
for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters 
within the EU.  It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU 
framework.”22  The Military Staff of the EU is the source of the EU’s military expertise 
that performs “’early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg 
tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces’ and to 
implement policies and decisions as directed by the European Union Military 
Committee.”23  Even with the EU’s continued advances in preparing to meet the “headline 
goal,” which calls for many ground force improvements, the EU continually fails to make 
more than minimal references to naval improvement requirements.   
The EU’s declared goals, which reflect a continued desire on the part of the EU 
states to reduce their reliance on the United States military and assume greater 
responsibility for regional defense and security, have not yet been fully achieved.  The  
EU’s interest in accepting greater responsibility in international security was articulated in 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1991.   The member states were not ready to supply the tools  
needed to meet their objectives because they lacked the political will to do so.  Since 1992 
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NATO European nations have cut their defense budgets by twenty-two percent in real 
terms.24  NATO European policy makers do not see an identifiable enemy requiring 
military precautions comparable to those during the Cold War.  They see a greater need to 
spend public funds in the domestic arena and thereby support the expanding European 
Union socially and economically.  For these reasons, the strength of the resolve behind the  
CFSP has been questioned; and this resolve is unlikely to be substantially bolstered in the 
foreseeable future.  With the political leaders of the EU calling for improved military 
forces but unlikely to seek significant capabilities beyond their stated “headline goal” to 
be fulfilled by 2003, the United States and the other NATO allies are needed to fill the 
void.  This is particularly true with regard to naval capabilities because the need for naval 
forces is increasing for various reasons, as noted earlier; and the European Union’s 
declared goals give little attention to naval capabilities.  Instead, the EU has chosen to 
concentrate on ground forces for peacekeeping.   
U.S. maritime forces of the early and mid-twentieth century embodied many of the 
flexible attributes that today’s forces have but were called on primarily to carry out 
traditional naval activities in warfighting and protection of communications and supply.  
New technology and warfighting advances were pursued during the two World Wars and 
the Cold War, with increasing attention to the need to prepare for multinational operations 
in coordination with allied navies.  This need to create multinational coalition maritime 
forces during conflict will persist during the twenty-first century due to multipolar threats, 
increased demands from the political arena, and economic competition.   
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C.  BUILDING UNITED STATES AND NATO MULTINATIONAL 
MARITIME FORCES 
A navy is a state’s primary instrument of maritime force.  Deciding what to use 
this force for is determined by political, economic, and military needs or goals.  These 
choices are made according to a nation’s stated goals, perceived threats, and economic 
opportunities.  In the late nineteenth century, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concept of sea power 
as a means of offensive sea control transformed American naval strategy and force 
structures toward a concentrated battle fleet bent on the destruction of the enemy fleet.25  
In Mahan’s view, commercial shipping constituted the primary form of movement for 
trade, and there was therefore a clear justification for a strong Navy to protect it.  Not only 
did the Navy exist to protect commercial ships but also to enforce decisions affecting 
economic, geographical, political, and cultural interests at home and abroad.26   
This doctrine of offensive sea control offered the Navy scope for initiative and 
made it an integral part of United States national policy and military strategy during the 
Cold War and beyond.  Mahan believed that “the purpose of naval strategy is to gain 
control of the sea.”  This belief was in many ways foreshadowed by George Washington, 
who held that “in any operation and under all circumstances a decisive Naval superiority 
is to be considered as a fundamental principle and the basis in which every hope of 
success must ultimately depend.”27  The concept of  “control of the sea” via naval 
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superiority was transferred to the multinational maritime forces of NATO in opposing the 
formidable Soviet naval threat in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean during the Cold War.   
NATO was in reality a maritime coalition from the very beginning during the Cold 
War.  Sea power--both forward-deployed and on the high seas, led by the United States 
Navy and continually applied in cooperation with the other maritime powers of NATO-- 
constituted a key component of the overall deterrence posture and collective defense of 
NATO against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners.  The collective defense 
pledge was defined in Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty:  
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.28      
 
The maritime forces of NATO played such a significant role in this collective 
defense at the beginning of the Cold War because the allied military high command did 
not believe that its combined land forces could successfully stop a Soviet ground assault in 
Western Europe, the Mediterranean, or the Middle East.  Sea power was seen as essential 
to assist the NATO powers in opposing the massive Soviet land forces.  Naval planning 
outlined as one scenario that in the event of war the first task would be for naval forces to 
secure the seas in order to evacuate all Western land forces from Western Europe.  
NATO’s maritime forces, led by the United States, would secure the lines of 
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communication across the Atlantic to Canada and the United States, establish forward 
bases in Iceland and the Azores, and commence offensive operations in the Mediterranean.  
Offensive operations were to be carried out by projecting power ashore with numerous 
aircraft carriers plus supporting naval forces to slow the movement of Soviet ground 
forces throughout Europe.29   
The ability of the allies to take the war to the Soviets would rely on NATO’s 
maritime forces to secure lines of communications and supply routes from the United 
States to Europe as well to project power onto the periphery of Europe in the face of a 
formidable Soviet naval submarine threat.  NATO planners intended to carry out the 
convoy aspect of the war in the same way that supply lines were protected during World  
War II.  To improve their ability to protect convoys, the United States Navy and the Royal 
Navy began coordinating planning to standardize operations, logistics, and 
communications in the event of war.   
By late 1950, NATO realized that planning to liberate Western Europe after Soviet 
conquest would be a disaster, so policy shifted to holding the line as far east as possible.  
This policy shift placed greater pressure on Alliance maritime forces to get reinforcement 
troops across the Atlantic to the front lines on the East-West border even more quickly.  
To emphasize the importance and responsibility of naval forces in the defense of Western 
Europe, naval forces were placed under a unified command, Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic, SACLANT.  Prior to the establishment of NATO’s naval commands several 
multinational naval exercises were carried out invo lving member nations.  In 1949-1951 
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exercises VERITY, ACTIVITY, and PROGRESS were carried out involving British, 
Dutch, Norwegian, French, and Danish naval forces preparing for convoy protection and 
anti-submarine warfare; they exercised communications and tactical procedures.30  Further 
exercises carried out in 1951 involved the British, French, Italian, and American navies in 
the Mediterranean testing convoy escort, surface capabilities, anti-submarine warfare, and 
carrier operations. 
D. INITIAL NAVAL COMMAND STRUCTURES IN NATO 
In January 1952, Lynde McCormick, USN, was appointed SACLANT, a command 
at the same level as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SACEUR.  Further command 
posts, Commander- in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN) and Commander-in-Chief 
Mediterranean (CINCAFMED), were created as compensation to the British for the 
appointment of a United States officer as SACLANT, but the United States Sixth Fleet 
stationed in the Mediterranean remained subordinate to SACEUR. 31  In late 1952, NATO 
held its first major naval exercise, MAINBRACE, to test capabilities and allied 
cooperation in defending the Scandinavian allies from Soviet aggression.  This exercise 
helped in coordinating plans for defense of the region but also served a political purpose in 
that it reassured the Scandinavian allies that they would be protected by the Alliance in 
case of aggression. 32   
To satisfy member nations that had historically protected the eastern Atlantic and 
Mediterranean “a somewhat awkward compromise” was devised regarding command 
arrangements.  SACEUR established a subordinate Commander- in-Chief Allied Forces 
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South, CINCSOUTH.  CINCSOUTH established three subordinate commands for air, 
land, and sea components of allied forces under his command.  The sea component 
command, Commander Allied Naval Forces South (COMNAVSOUTH), was headed by 
CINCSOUTH himself, a United States Navy Admiral.  Under COMNAVSOUTH were 
French, Italian, and United States forces—including the U.S. Sixth Fleet.  British naval 
forces in the Mediterranean were not subordinate to this command structure but were 
available for the collective defense of NATO.  They operated under their own command 
organization and protected Britain’s national interests in the eastern Mediterranean 
region.33   
With the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO in February 1952, further 
naval command changes took place.  The air and land forces of Athens and Ankara came 
under CINCSOUTH, but their naval units came under a new NATO command, Allied 
Forces Mediterranean, AFMED.  As Joel Sokolsky has observed, “With the creation of 
AFMED, NAVSOUTH was abolished.”34  Naval forces from Italy, France, Greece, and 
Turkey fell under the command of CINCAFMED, who was also the British Commander-
in-Chief Mediterranean Fleet, and responsible for protecting the sea lines of 
communications across the Mediterranean. 35   
Separated from the AFMED command structure was the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which 
remained under CINCSOUTH as Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe, or 
                                                 
 
32 Sokols ky, p. 21. 
33 Sokolsky, p. 29. 
34 Sokolsky, p. 30. 
35 Sokolsky, pp. 29-30. 
22 
STRIKFORSOUTH.  The Sixth Fleet’s primary mission changed from defending the sea 
lines of communication (AFMED’s responsibility) to conventional and nuclear air support 
for allied armies resisting the advance of Soviet land and air forces.  Its continuing 
missions would include the conduct of amphibious operations to counterattack the 
advancing Soviet land and air threat.  This would be the first flexible and mobile carrier 
striking force that would primarily be used to project power ashore in support of 
SACEUR’s ground components and the primary NATO mission of defending Western 
Europe.  This change in the command structure was significant because naval forces were 
now directly committed to the ground campaign to defend Southern and Western 
Europe.36 
The first major large-scale NATO exercises held in the Mediterranean were 
MEDFLEXABLE and WELDFAST.  They took place in 1953 and 1954 under the 
direction of CINCSOUTH.  Further exercises were held by AFSOUTH to practice 
implementing war plans and securing sea lines of communications.37  With the 
establishment of these integrated military structures and continued multinational exercises, 
NATO maritime forces believed they were ready for all plausible contingencies.  The 
positive results gained from these exercises paved the way for further implementation of 
the naval multi-nationality concept within NATO.                 
The maritime structure established by NATO involved multiple commands.  
Unlike the ground component commands under SACEUR, there was no single allied 
commander in charge of all NATO maritime forces in time of war.  SACEUR would have 
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operational control over the naval components of CINCNORTH and CINCSOUTH, but 
would not have control over British forces in the English Channel or forces assigned to 
SACLANT.  Many of the maritime commanders, however, had dual-hatted positions that 
allowed them to control their national forces at all times while working with allied navies 
and staffs in the Atlantic or Mediterranean.  Indeed, NATO maritime commanders 
performed peacetime functions as national commanders, and practiced for wartime 
situations with allied navies in exercises.  This gave NATO a permanent on-call standing 
maritime contingent immediately ready for action in the form of major British and United 
States assets, plus the naval capabilities of the other allies, particularly France. 
From 1958 to 1966, French President Charles de Gaulle conducted a gradual 
withdrawal of French forces from NATO.  France’s incremental withdrawal from NATO 
military institutions was conducted in conjunction with de Gaulle’s denunciations of the 
Alliance’s military integration, and many thought that de Gaulle would propose a 
revamping of the Alliance before the denunciation deadline of 1969.38  The gradual 
withdrawal of French maritime forces was finalized when they were removed from the 
Mediterranean and “reconstituted as a primarily Atlantic fleet of 250,000 tons and 270 
naval aircraft.”39  The withdrawal of French naval forces in the Mediterranean from 
NATO command structures began in December 1958.40         
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In a belated acknowledgement of the difficulties engrained in the command 
structure, in 1967 NATO created its first multinational naval force, Standing Naval Force 
Atlantic (SNFL), to participate in allied exercises and joint maritime training, and to 
demonstrate the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance.41  It consisted of four to six frigates 
and destroyers that would embody the versatile, highly mobile, and flexible forces needed 
to conduct action against immediate threats to the Alliance throughout NATO’s area of 
responsibility.  These forces, while not as formidable as a carrier battlegroup, served as a 
symbol of the Alliance’s solidarity that could go promptly to the threatened area and be 
reinforced by other allied naval units inport, underway, or deployed throughout the region.  
In conjunction with SNFL forces deployed every six months, NATO relied on the naval 
forces of smaller member nations to patrol their own coastal waters and to protect against 
Soviet submarine threats and coastal blockades.   
With the Atlantic region covered by SNFL and coastal patrols, the Mediterranean 
soon saw an increase in Soviet naval activity.  In response to these developments, in May 
1969 NATO’s Defense Planning Committee approved the Naval On-Call Force 
Mediterranean.  This naval force, composed of four to six destroyers and frigates, would 
play an important deterrent role.  It opposed the Soviet deployments by showing the 
Alliance’s determination and solidarity in deploying under one flag as SNFL did in the 
Atlantic.  The Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean was assigned to NAVSOUTH and later 
AFMED and would be deployed forty-three times from 1970 to 1991 when a permanent 
force, Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM), replaced it.42  The deployment of 
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SNFL and the Naval On-Call Forces Mediterranean was a beginning that could help to 
improve the fragmented command structure; but U.S. carrier battlegroups and British 
naval units constituted the bulk of NATO’s maritime forces.   
NATO did not face a large number of permanently deployed Soviet naval forces 
on the high seas until the late 1960s.  This allowed NATO time to prepare for a Soviet 
naval assault.  The Soviets would have had to move out to sea to attack NATO maritime 
assets, and this would have given NATO time to activate its maritime assets to prepare for 
the assault.  Even if the Soviets had launched a ground assault first, NATO maritime 
assets would still have had ample time to prepare for the Soviet naval assault.  While this 
was not an optimal situation, NATO naval leaders believed they had no need to revamp 
NATO’s command structure because its maritime strategy could be employed in time to 
counter any Soviet naval threat effectively.   
This naval command structure was maintained with few changes until the end of 
the Cold War.  Despite continuity in the command structure, NATO maritime forces had 
to adapt their tactics and capabilities to meet the growing Soviet naval battlegroup and 
submarine threat of the 1970s and 1980s. The United States Navy and other NATO 
maritime forces continued to meet the Soviet challenges by building larger force structures 
and hedging against the threat of Soviet aggression.  In such a war NATO’s ability to 
secure, deny, and exploit the seas would be crucial to the war effort to protect the seaward 
approaches to Europe for communications and supply.  These aspects of naval warfare 
were crucial during the Cold War and NATO’s maritime component was ready for those 
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challenges.  Once the Cold War ended, NATO planners and naval leaders realized that 
they had to adapt to the security environment of the post-Cold War world.   
E. NEW COMMAND STRUCTURES 
The process of changing the military command structure can be traced back to the 
1990 London Declaration in which NATO leaders called for a process to adapt to the 
changes that were taking place in Europe.43  Another development that helped lead to 
changing the command structures was the adoption of the new Alliance Strategic Concept 
in 1991.  The 1991 Strategic Concept called for greater attention to the Alliance’s security 
tasks and to the strategic environment, which was evolving much more quickly and much 
more unpredictably than expected.  The 1991 Strategic Concept also called for smaller 
forces with “enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation 
when necessary,” for purposes of crisis management and opposing attacks against any 
ally.44  These forces were to be able to rapidly meet any new challenge of a limited scope.  
Although this concept sounds like NATO was readying itself for the peacekeeping 
missions of the middle to late 1990s, it was not.  NATO’s “mission remained collective 
defense against aggression affecting Alliance territory, not intervention beyond that 
territory.”45  In 1994, the Military Committee launched the Long-Term Study (LTS), 
which called for integrated military structures that would facilitate the construction of 
ESDI within NATO and allow all participating allies to have a more active role in the 
decision-making process.   
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As part of the adaptation process, efforts to improve the Alliance’s capabilities 
while fulfilling its roles and missions encompassed three fundamental objectives:  “the 
Alliance’s military effectiveness had to be ensured; the transatlantic link preserved; and 
the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) developed within the Alliance.”46  
The key would be to make adaptations to enable the Alliance to expand with the times and 
to incorporate changes as necessary to meet the threat.  NATO would need to be able to 
meet the diverse challenges facing its member nations, to include Article 5 and non-
Article 5 crises.  The new command structure also has to allow for the growth and 
flexibility needed for the addition of new members into NATO.   
The Strategic Commands are responsible for the overall planning, direction, and 
conduct of Alliance military activities under their authority.  The Regional Commands 
subordinate to the Strategic Commands are responsible for planning and execution of 
Alliance military activities and may delegate responsibility to the Component Commands 
or Joint Sub-Regional Commands under their authority.  With the new command and 
control structure comes a new concept of how to do business.  The interrelationships 
between commands allow for a more flexible way to conduct operations while relying 
more heavily on multinational forces.  The supported-supporting command relationship 
enables commands to transfer responsibility for certain activities more easily to other 
commands, thus providing more flexibility.  Commands will be more interdependent 
because of limited personnel in each command.  Regionally based headquarters will be 
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able to receive forces and support forces from other regions if necessary and with greater 
ease.47  Each command will be manned multinationally, with representation of all member 
countries at the Strategic Command level.  This will allow for greater reinforcement 
capacity and wider participation in multinational operations at the regional command 
level.48 
F.  NEW CONCEPTS 
Allowing for the changing security environment, the new command structure--as 
endorsed at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit--takes into account the Combined Joint 
Task Force (CJTF), ESDI, and Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) concepts.  The new 
command structure within NATO also takes into account the anticipated requirements that 
NATO capabilities and common assets could be released to the EU for use in EU-led 
operations as discussed at the June 1999 European Council in Cologne.  This EU Council 
approved the transfer of WEU institutional functions from the WEU to the EU.   
Operations known in NATO parlance as non-Article 5 operations do not involve collective 
self-defense but rather crisis situations, and are called the Petersberg Tasks in the EU.  
This integrated military structure allows the Alliance an enhanced capacity to perform the 
new range of roles and missions described by NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept.  
One of the main purposes of the 1999 Strategic Concept is to enable the Alliance 
to deal with future security challenges and risks.  Europe has seen the threat of a general 
war subside but the risks and uncertainties facing the Allies have increased; therefore, the 
1999 Strategic Concept calls for the following elements:  “the preservation of the 
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transatlantic link, the maintenance of effective military capabilities, the development of 
ESDI within the Alliance, conflict prevention and crisis management, partnership with 
cooperation and dialogue, enlargement, arms control, disarmament, and non-
proliferation.”49   
Further development of ESDI within the NATO framework means:  ensuring 
development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the 
EU and NATO based on mechanisms established between NATO and the WEU; 
participation of non-EU European Allies; and practical arrangements for EU access to 
NATO planning capabilities and NATO’s collective assets and capabilities.50   
The 1999 Strategic Concept also calls for continued development of the military 
capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance’s missions.  Key goals in this regard 
are specified in NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI).  The DCI is “designed to 
ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update 
their capabilities to face the new security challenges.”51  During the Cold War, NATO 
planners were primarily concerned with maintaining the capabilities needed to resist 
potential aggression or coercion by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, but in 
today’s security environment NATO must be ready to deploy forces beyond its borders to 
manage crises.  DCI aims are grouped in five major areas:  mobility and deployability, 
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sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and interoperable communications.  
These aims are needed to significantly enhance European militaries to lessen the 
capabilities gap between themselves and the armed forces of the United States.52  With 
continued focus on the key technological, doctrinal, and organizational elements 
mentioned in the aims for DCI, military capabilities could be strengthened as well as the 
“European pillar” of NATO.   
To help in this process, NATO’s maritime forces must continue to maintain and 
enhance their capabilities and incorporate technological advances into their warfare 
systems because the U.S.-European capabilities gap is widening, as became evident during 
Operation Allied Force in 1999.  More than 70 percent of the firepower employed was 
supplied by the United States.  Only Britain and  the United States contributed cruise 
missiles.  Only 10 percent of allied aircraft were able to conduct precision bomb attacks.  
Only France among the European Allies made a significant contribution to nighttime 
bombing raids.  The United States was the only member country able to contribute 
strategic bombers and stealth aircraft to the operation. 53  The European Allies also lacked 
reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft.   
These deficiencies have to be addressed for a true coalition of NATO members to 
take part in demanding multinational operations.  With these problems in mind, the 
structures and initiatives involving naval forces, which are earmarked as key instruments 
for the new Command Structure, may help NATO and the EU to work together more 
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closely.  By working together, they may improve their capacity to effectively engage 
opposing forces and respond to crisis situations by being forward-deployed, sustained, 
flexible, mobile, and interoperable. 
The new command  structure is designed to be operationally effective and to 
facilitate integration within the Alliance.  As part of NATO’s new command structure, 
regional headquarters of AFSOUTH, STRIKFORSOUTH and a sister amphibious 
command, Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED), coordinate forces 
that may see action in future multinational operations.  The European Multi-national 
Maritime Force (EMMF) concept is yet another naval force concept that has been 
approved by NATO for possible future use.  An EMMF force could be formed on a case-
by-case basis to deal with crisis situations, with the concurrence with the North Atlantic 
Council.  Its employment could also be EU-led and directed toward the accomplishment  
of the “Petersberg Tasks.”  This concept therefore falls under the auspices of the 
development of ESDI within NATO, including the identification of NATO assets and 
capabilities that could be made available for EU-led crisis operations.  In another ESDI-
related development, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have identified naval forces to be 
made available for WEU/EU-led operations through EUROMARFOR.       
G.  CURRENT NAVAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Since the end of the Cold War the concept of destroying the enemy fleet in a head 
to head “blue water” engagement has become less prominent.  Today’s maritime forces 
use advanced submarines, aircraft, and precision-guided bombs and missiles to achieve 
battlespace dominance or sea control as well to project power ashore.  Today’s littoral-
focused navy operates within three hundred miles of the coastline with an emphasis on 
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controlling the sea lanes and the inland areas adjacent to those sea lanes while projecting 
power from the sea to land.  
1. STRIKFORSOUTH 
The post-Cold War scene in Europe since 1989 has been defined primarily by non-
Article 5 situations.  For this reason, NATO and European naval forces have had to adapt 
to meet non-Article 5 crisis response challenges.  Improvements in power projection 
capability, C3 (command, control, and communications), and increased interoperability 
are needed to conduct no-fly zone enforcement, embargoes, reconnaissance, surveillance, 
air suppression, and amphibious/expeditionary operations.  With this in mind, the new 
Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH), an exercise-
coordinating agency during the Cold War, is being recast as part of the new NATO 
structure: 
COMSTRIKSOUTH is to be prepared to conduct maritime striking and 
multinational amphibious/expeditionary operations and to support and/or 
reinforce both inter/intra-regionally.  He is also to contribute to the 
preservation of peace and the promotion of stability through cooperation 
and dialogue, participate in crisis management and be prepared to plan and 
execute, or provide support for, expanded roles and missions, as assigned 
by CINCSOUTH. 54 
 
In September 1999 STRIKFORSOUTH became a NATO force struc ture 
headquarters under the new command structure.  A Regional Reaction Force 
Headquarters, STRIKFORSOUTH has eight participating Allies: Germany, Greece, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Its core 
capabilities include: rapidly deployable sea-based command, control, and communications 
assets with embedded forward headquarters; multiple carrier battlegroups; surface and  
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subsurface strike platforms armed with Tomahawk missiles; multi-national amphibious 
attack forces for simultaneous or sequential employment; and sea-based expeditionary 
logistics.  Its operational tasks include: conducting theater deterrence and shaping 
operations, enabling force operations, regionally based CJTF operations, out-of-area 
operations, independent small-scale crisis response operations.  Moreover, it provides 
headquarters for ESDI (that is, EU-led) operations and  NATO power projection 
operations.  It also serves as an operational theater headquarters for sustained operations.55   
Its areas primarily include the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf.56 
The changes in STRIKFORSOUTH from the Cold War roles it once fulfilled came 
about because of operational demands in the Balkans starting in 1995.  
STRIKFORSOUTH commanded U.S. forces preparing for intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict; and when Operation Allied Force began in March 1999, other NATO members 
came under the authority of AFSOUTH.   
The benefits of STRIKFORSOUTH for preparing for multinational operations are 
many.  As a force structure headquarters, participating members only have to agree among 
themselves on the changes they see fit for the organization.  This includes modifying 
budgets, personnel structures, forces assigned to the command, exercises, and other 
activities.57  This allows for a greater chance to pursue enhanced interoperability among 
participating forces.  It also allows for capability improvements to deal with a broad 
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spectrum of challenges.  This autonomy among participating nations within the regional 
command structure creates a framework in which the countries and the organization can 
improve their military posture.      
2.  CAFMED 
With the great latitude that STRIKFORSOUTH has been afforded, it has devised 
the concept of a Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean (CAFMED).  It developed 
the concept in 1991 within its own amphibious warfare division, and the concept was 
approved by SACEUR in November 1995.58  CAFMED is the means by which 
STRIKFORSOUTH seeks to enhance the interoperability and effectiveness of the 
multinational NATO amphibious forces in the Mediterranean, along with additional forces 
provided by member countries.  The aim is to be able to deploy a brigade-size landing 
force tailored to its mission.  The force has to be self-sustaining for 15 days, and supported 
by adequate naval ship and air assets.  CAFMED is not a standing force, but it is readily 
deployable because member countries have earmarked forces for specific purposes.  It 
would take time to structure and prepare the force needed, but the right force would be 
deployed as quickly as possible.  CAFMED’s missions in peacetime as well as crisis 
situations would include the seizure of choke points, islands, and port facilities; 
amphibious assault operations; and special operations.59  Its forces will be flexible and 
expeditionary in nature, capable of performing not only traditional amphibious assault 
operations, but also non-traditional tasks called for in today’s changing security 
environment.     
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The CAFMED concept has its origins in the United States Commander Combined 
Amphibious Task Force (CCATF)/Commander Combined Landing Force (CCLF) 
concept.  The responsibilities will be split between staffs assigned to specific headquarters 
but composed of officers from all the participating countries.  The multinational planning 
staff is made up of five marines and three naval officers from the participating countries.  
The CAFMED concept has been implemented in the “DESTINED GLORY” series of 
exercises first held in 1995 and most recently held in the Aegean Sea in October 2000.60  
Further exercises continue to broaden the spectrum of tasks that CAFMED can undertake 
in coordination with STRIKFORSOUTH.  In 1995, CAFMED undertook the exercise 
“DYNAMIC IMPACT” which practiced reinforcement and withdrawal of UN troops from 
a peacekeeping mission in which the situation escalated from easy to difficult.  It showed 
how amphibious forces can be used to project power ashore or respond to crisis situations.  
The Commander of AFSOUTH regarded the exercise as “a watershed in the history of 
NATO” because of the tactical interplay between nations and the interoperable training 
that took place.61         
In 1998, exercise “DYNAMIC RESPONSE” demonstrated NATO’s capacity to 
reinforce the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia.62  This exercise was a primary 
example of how important it is to have amphibious forces in the Mediterranean theater.  
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These forces could carry out non-traditional amphibious missions while still maintaining 
the ability to carry out the traditional missions that could be required at any time.  
CAFMED forces, with STRIKFORSOUTH leadership, planning, and support, are able to 
sustain all the characteristics of a traditional expeditionary naval force while maintaining 
the power projection assets needed for today’s operations, including a high level of 
operational readiness.   
3.  EUROMARFOR 
The EUROMARFOR concept was devised to contribute to the development of 
ESDI.  At the WEU ministerial meeting in Lisbon in May 1995, Ministers welcomed the 
decision of France, Italy, and Spain to organize EUROMARFOR.  Portugal, the fourth 
member of EUROMARFOR, announced its decision to join on the same day as France, 
Italy, and Spain; and Portugal has participated from the outset.63  Membership has been 
open to other WEU members, although none have to date joined.  The participating 
countries have declared that their EUROMARFOR-designated assets are "’forces 
answerable to the WEU’, that they would be employed as a priority in this framework, that 
they could likewise be employed in the framework of NATO, so as to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Alliance, and that the fulfillment of their missions will not prejudice 
the participation of their units in the common defense missions provided for by Article V 
of the Modified Brussels Treaty, and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”64  
EUROMARFOR is  a non-standing pre-configured force with maritime and amphibious 
capabilities.  The tasks of EUROMARFOR primarily deal with humanitarian aid, search 
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and rescue, evacuation, surveillance, maritime police, and maritime control in a crisis area.  
The participating nations (France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) have indicated that these 
forces could be made available for WEU, NATO, EU, or UN purposes.65  If 
EUROMARFOR units are used, a high- level inter-governmental committee will establish 
the terms for its employment and give direction to the leadership.  The member countries 
will be responsible for stipulating the conditions for use of the force by the WEU or any 
other international organization.  Command of the force rotates annually among the 
member nations.       
EUROMARFOR, activated on October 2, 1995, is primarily oriented to the 
Mediterranean and would be typically composed of an aircraft carrier and four to six 
escorts, a landing force, amphibious ships, and a combat supply ship.  Assets are 
earmarked by the participating countries, which could assign them to meet any specific 
WEU, EU, or UN operational request.  The participating countries have indicated that 
their primary intention is to employ EUROMARFOR under WEU control, but it could be 
deployed under NATO’s control.  If not deployed for specific missions, it is activated one  
or two times a year for exercises organized by the WEU permanent planning cell.  The 
permanent cell is made up of four officers, one from each participating country, with a 
rotating command.66  
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Continued cooperation between the WEU and NATO regarding further 
development of the CJTF concept is paramount as EUROMARFOR develops through 
exercises and operations.  The potential benefits of EUROMARFOR are noteworthy.  
First of all, it has not presented additional expenses to member countries because it 
employs  the existing forces and  command structures of the member countries.  It is pre-
structured to meet its deployed challenges.  It is non-permanent and assembled on a case-
by-case basis to carry out a specific mission that it has trained for in advance.  These 
benefits have been apparent during the exercises in which EUROMARFOR has been 
activated.67  These exercises helped the participating maritime forces work on planning 
and joint operations and provided valuable practical lessons for future exercises and 
operations. 
4.  EMMF 
The initiative for the European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF) concept 
comes from an idea presented in 1999 by Dutch Defense minister Frank De Grave and 
supported by the French. 68  The Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), 
Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., indicated in April 1999 that the initiative “seeks to 
capitalize on NATO’s strengths:  the existing trained multinational forces; our common 
doctrine; our practiced exercise structure, and our mature command and control 
organization.”69   
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The EMMF concept takes into account arrangements previously agreed on by 
NATO and the WEU for forces available for WEU purposes.  The EMMF concept 
indicates that a maritime force could be constituted under the political and strategic 
direction of the WEU, with the case-by-case concurrence of the North Atlantic Council.  
This force could include command and control elements from NATO’s command 
structure and assets from the NATO force structure.  These assets could be made available 
by NATO nations to the WEU. With the concurrence of the WEU and the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC), non-NATO countries could also participate in an EMMF operation.  If 
activated, EMMF would be open to any NATO country that wanted to participate.   
The EMMF concept identifies existing NATO assets and capabilities already 
required for the full range of Alliance missions, which could be employed subject to the 
North Atlantic Council’s approval to perform “Petersberg Tasks” under the political 
control and strategic direction of the WEU.  Given the task-oriented nature of the EMMF, 
it could be employed as an independent maritime force or as a component of a CJTF as 
long as it is tailored to the mission.  The Deputy SACEUR will be responsible for the 
turnover process, coordination, and activation, as well as the return of forces to NATO 
commands from under WEU control.  With this in mind, the forces most likely to be 
assigned to act under WEU control will be those earmarked for NATO and answerable to 
the WEU.  The EMMF concept is a NATO concept developed as a contribution to the 
further development of ESDI within NATO. 
H.  CONCLUSIONS 
Although the security environment and political landscape in Europe have changed 
radically, NATO’s maritime forces remain essential.  With their inherent mobility, 
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flexibility, endurance, autonomy, and ability to operate without local host nation support, 
maritime forces are ideally suited to provide peacetime military presence and crisis 
response.  They convey calculated ambiguity and offer a range of calibrated responses.  
Their presence does not commit the alliance to a given course of action, but provides an 
array of political and military options.  New crisis situations can be expected around  
NATO’s periphery.  Naval command organizations (and concepts) such as 
STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, EUROMARFOR, and EMMF could be employed in 
NATO and EU-led operations.  The EU has called for few improvements in naval 
capabilities, and EU member nations are unlikely to make even minimal improvements 
soon.  The United States, NATO, and European naval organizations have to adapt to the 
changing international security environment, and make corresponding improvements and 
adaptations in their capabilities and structures because naval forces are among the most 
useful assets to deal with these evolving challenges. 
In the future, the United States should encourage further development of the naval 
multinationality concept within NATO to strengthen ESDI and NATO-EU partnership.  
NATO’s DCI goals are to “ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that 
they also improve and update their capabilities to face the new security challenges.”70  For 
these naval organizational initiatives to gain positive results, the United States has to 
retain its influence, support constructive  and positive approaches, and most of all remain 
actively involved in Europe as the EU’s ESDP and military organizations and capabilities 
adapt and evolve to meet the tasks at hand. 
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 III.  THE EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
 
The post-Cold War international security environment has been marked with great 
uncertainty and dramatic changes throughout the Euro-Atlantic region.  During the 
previous forty years, from 1949 to 1989, NATO operated in a historically limited area.  
The post-1989 developments have had a major impact on the way European political and  
security organizations have perceived their future security architecture and political 
requirements.  Many of the military and political principles followed during the bipolar 
Cold War no longer apply in the ever-changing security and political environment of the 
multipolar post-Cold War period.  Today’s military planners and politicians cannot 
specifically define the future of warfare or the conflicts that security organizations will 
most likely face.  Therefore, NATO and the European Union have to prepare for and 
respond to threats and risks by adapting their doctrine, forces, and decision-making 
arrangements.      
Security throughout NATO’s periphery in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and 
Southwest Asia is now more dependent upon the diversity, ability, and interaction of naval 
forces.  In contrast with Cold War preparations for clashes between huge land forces on 
the European continent, naval forces and their evolving command organizations and 
concepts (including STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, EUROMARFOR, and EMMF) give 
NATO and the EU the ability to meet any emerging security challenge.   Naval forces are 
able to handle immediate crisis situations while maintaining the ability to reach out on a 
global scale.  The diverse abilities of NATO naval forces can help to keep the threat of 




non-Article 5 crisis situations from expanding into Article 5 situations.  The ability of 
naval forces to handle an evolving situation may in some circumstances allow for land 
forces to be used much later and with less danger in crisis response contingencies or a 
stabilization process.   
As President Clinton indicated in 1996: 
Yesterday’s NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion.  
Tomorrow’s NATO must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend 
against threats to our security from beyond them—the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction, ethnic violence, and regional conflict.71 
 
A.  INSTABILITY, THE NEW ENEMY OF TODAY’S SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 
The new enemy faced today and in the future, as described by Admiral T. Joseph 
Lopez, Commander- in-Chief of AFSOUTH in 1998, is the instability thrust into NATO’s 
southern region. 72  This post-Cold War instability and the broadening of NATO’s 
responsibilities were most recently seen in the Kosovo conflict.  These operations 
demonstrated that NATO and the WEU could work together to achieve a goal.  Operation 
Deliberate Force in 1995 and Operation Allied Force in 1999 also showed that many 
warfighting capabilities need to be improved.  New technologies and capabilities for 
future naval operations need to be developed within the European Union and in non-EU 
NATO European allies to successfully achieve battlespace dominance and interoperability 
with United States forces.   
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Instability is nowhere more prevalent than in the southern and eastern regions of 
NATO’s periphery.  Conflicts are likely in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest 
Asia, given their diverse cultures, economic problems, and engrained political 
antagonisms.  These instabilities could affect the present and future security of Europe as 
well as the Atlantic Alliance. 
Many of the primary factors that cause instability in North Africa, the Middle East, 
and Southwest Asia stem from political and economic factors, including religious and 
political extremists, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflict, nationalism, 
and illegal immigration.  The latter sometimes involves refugees flocking to neighboring 
countries in search of safety and a better life.  Other factors that cross borders and affect 
numerous countries throughout these regions both economically and politically include 
strategic natural resources: water, oil, and gas.  In order to deal with crises in troubled 
regions, NATO and the EU have to possess flexible naval forces that are capable of 
carrying out non-traditional roles as well as the traditional roles of projecting power 
ashore while maintaining political influence, protecting economic prosperity, and 
maintaining military superiority at all times.  In short, today’s naval forces have to be 
ready to be engaged across the full spectrum of changing and escalating conflicts:  
intrastate, interstate, and transstate.73           
As NATO Secretary General Javier Solana said in 1996:  
NATO’s key strategic objective is to help create political conditions which 
make crises and conflicts less and less likely.  This is what we mean when 
we speak about building a new European security architecture: building a 
set of political relationships where each state feels secure and at ease.  
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This—not the antagonism of the past—is the context in which NATO’s 
approach to the Mediterranean must be viewed.  NATO must look to the 
South, as well as it must look to the East.  NATO does not see the world in 
terms of cultural clashes.  Rather, it focuses on avoiding instability—the 
threat which all of us have to guard against.74   
NATO is protecting the interests of its member nations in a volatile international 
security environment.  The best way to protect these interests is to handle potential 
problems on the scene of the events or in very close proximity through forward 
engagement.  It is much more difficult to react immediately to an evolving situation if 
forces are not present or prepared to act as quickly as possible.  In many circumstances, 
the forces most suitable for immediate action in a crisis situation are naval forces.  By 
being forward engaged, NATO and the EU are able to maintain defensive capabilities and 
to adapt to the changing security environment in any crisis situation or peacekeeping 
operation. 75 
B. TERRORISM AND THE GLOBAL THREAT 
Terrorism is a constant and real threat to the United States and other countries 
around the world.  No better example can be found to illustrate this threat to naval forces 
than the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) on October 12, 2000, in the port of Aden, 
Yemen, where seventeen United States sailors were killed.76  Other recent examples of 
terrorism affecting United States citizens and interests abroad include the 1993 bombing 
of New York City’s World Trade Center, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing,  and the 
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August 1998 bombings of United States embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and 
Nairobi, Kenya.  These terrorist attacks and other indiscriminate acts like the 1995 nerve 
gas attack in a Tokyo subway show that terrorism is capable of directly or indirectly 
affecting United States citizens and/or interests.       
1.  The Changing Roles of Terrorism 
During the last decade a quickly changing international security environment has 
made previously understood Cold War assumptions and strategies irrelevant  and has 
brought new debates about  today’s ambiguous risks.  The professional terrorist of the past 
was motivated by ideology or nationalism; operated according to a set of rules, including a 
specific political agenda and typical arms and bombs; and was sponsored by a state known 
to harbor terrorists.77  Although such older terrorist organizations still exist, these older 
and more identifiable organizations are being joined by a variety of new organizations.  
According to the U.S. State Department’s annual report on international terrorism for 
1999, the number of terrorist incidents rose from 274 attacks in 1998 to 392 in 1999 and  
the number of persons killed fell from 741 to 233, while those wounded fell from 5,962 to 
706.78  While everyone would view the decreased number of deaths as positive, experts 
see the increase in the number of actual attacks as a warning sign for the future.  The new 
terrorists that are organizing these numerous attacks are less structured, less traditional, 
and more characterized by a religious or quasi-religious mindset.  According to Bruce 
Hoffman of the RAND Corporation,   
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The emergence of religion as a driving force behind the increasing lethality 
of international terrorism shatters some of our most basic assumptions 
about terrorists.  In the past, most analysts tended to discount the possibility 
of mass killing involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
terrorism…  Terrorists, we assured ourselves, wanted more people 
watching than dead…  The compelling new motives of the religious 
terrorist, however, coupled with increased access to critical information and 
to key components of weapons of mass destruction, render conventional 
wisdom dangerously anachronistic.79   
 
During the Cold War, many terrorist groups were affiliated with Marxist-Leninist 
ideological organizations.80  The rise of “modern” religious terrorist groups came about as 
a result of the 1979 Iranian revolution.  New motivations for terrorist activities reside in 
political affiliations and desires to oppose Western influences in non-Western societies.  
Even though religious terrorist groups existed in the 1980s, they were state-sponsored and 
followed traditional patterns in trying to achieve distinct political objectives. 
Terrorism was kept in check more often than not because of the antagonistic  
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.  The Cold War world was 
tumultuous but predictable.  The fact that the Cold War was predictable created a 
relatively stable international context.  As old ideologies and the predictability brought 
about by the Cold War have disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is not 
surprising that religion has become the popular motivation behind terrorist activities.81  
With the Cold War at an end, ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, the 
Caucasus, and the Middle East abound.  This increase in violence and terrorist activity can 
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be partly traced to the increase in religious terrorist groups, paramilitary gangs, and local 
warlords.82  Since 1992 the largest and most organized terrorist groups have  claimed 
religion as their driving force; and their numbers have grown from simply two groups to 
nearly twenty-six (nearly one half of the terrorist organizations identified by the State 
Department as of 1996).83  According to the U. S. State Department, “One trend is the 
shift from well-organized, localized groups supported by state sponsors to loosely 
organized, international networks of terrorists.”84   
Terrorist group self-perceptions, primarily in Middle Eastern countries, have 
changed in that they now see themselves as the guarantors of their societies against 
Western corrupting principles—such as secularism and materialism.  The “irregular 
warfare” conducted by the terrorist today has destroyed the distinct understanding of 
terrorism developed during the Cold War.85  Today’s terrorism, led in many instances by 
religious organizations not aligned with states, is unpredictable and indiscriminate.  Due to 
the lack of predictability and the indiscriminate nature of today’s religiously-motivated 
terrorist, violence may escalate in order to wreak havoc and undermine U.S.- led Western 
influence in the world political system.  This chaos would be aimed at the United States in 
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particular because terrorists see their only option in opposing United States convent ional 
military power and world influence as through terror.   
2.  The Changing Face of Terrorism 
The traditional motivations for terrorists primarily included ethnic rivalries, 
religious differences, and differing political affiliations.  In the 1980s state-sponsored 
terrorism led by Libya and Iran was the means by which terrorists were funded, trained, 
and led.  Today, terrorism motivated by religion is more intense and violent and in many 
cases responsible for more deaths than non-religious forms of terrorism.  In 1995 only 25 
percent of the recorded international terrorist incidents were carried out in the name of 
religion but these incidents accounted for 58 percent of the total deaths.86  The higher 
proportion of deaths resulting from religious terrorist acts can be attributed to the 
“radically different value system, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts 
of morality, and worldviews embraced by the religious terrorist.”87   
As Bruce Hoffman describes the intensity of religious terrorism, 
violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in 
response to some theological demand or imperative.  Terrorism thus 
assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are consequently 
undeterred by political, moral, or practical constraints…  [R]eligious 
terrorists often seek to eliminate broadly defined categories of enemies and 
accordingly regard such large-scale violence not only as morally justified 
but as a necessary expedient to attain their goals.88   
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The best examples of these types of terrorist organizations and acts are those 
influenced, trained, and led by the Saudi born millionaire Osama bin Laden.   
Bin Laden, now one of the FBI’s ten most wanted, was formerly an American-
backed Mujahadeen “holy warrior” fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 
1980s.89  After the war in Afghanistan ended, Bin Laden emerged as the leader of “the 
base,” a terrorist organization of battle-tested veterans of the Afghan war that consisted 
primarily of religious fundamentalists.  Since the end of the Afghan war, Bin Laden has 
recruited many desperately poor people to join his ranks.  These recruits have carried out 
terrorist activities since the end of the Gulf War against American military personnel. 90  
His forces, based in Afghanistan, have ties to terrorists in as many as sixty other countries.  
Bin Laden has been linked to numerous terrorist activities, including the USS Cole attack.  
Bin Laden’s belief system and hatred reportedly derive  from his mistaken belief that the 
United States military presence in the Middle East amounts to “American occupation of 
Islamic countries.”91  These non-state-sponsored terrorist organizations attempting to keep 
Western influence out of the Islamic world are the most threatening types of terrorists.  
The threat is significant because of their unpredictability and because of America’s 
inability to pinpoint their location, or to coerce or directly influence these organizations.     
An even more troublesome aspect of terrorism resides in the risk that terrorists will 
engage in acts involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—that is, nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons.  Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, questions about  
                                                 
89 “FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives.” Available [Online]: http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten     
90 David Eberhart and Hans H. Chen. “Web of Terror, Bin Laden’s International Terror Network,” 
Available [Online]: http://www.apbonline.com/newscenter/majorcases/binladen/   
91 David Eberhart and Hans H. Chen. “Web of Terror, Bin Laden’s International Terror Network,” 
50 
mismanagement in handling WMD have arisen with regard to Russia and the other former 
Soviet republics.  The former Soviet Union has been judged a significant source of 
proliferation in WMD technology.  This increases the options available to terrorist 
organizations and “rogue” countries. 
There are many examples of how to deter and combat terrorism: Israel’s Operation 
Jonathan in Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976 rescued a highjacked airliner filled primarily with 
Israeli citizens.92  Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986 was a United States retaliatory 
strike against Libya for its involvement in the  terrorist bombing attack on a West Berlin 
disco on April 5, 1985.93  In August 1998, the United States retaliated to the 1998 
embassy bombings in Africa by launching Tomahawk attacks against Osama bin Laden’s 
Afghanistan training camps.  Retaliation is one method for combating terrorism, but 
inadequate as a deterrent factor.  The most effective means to combat terrorism at home 
and abroad rely on national and international responses, including prevention and 
deterrence.   
The United States follows four main policy tenets.  “First, make no concessions to 
terrorists and strike no deals.  Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes.  Third, 
isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their 
behavior.  Fourth, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with 
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the United States and require assistance.”94  Non-military policy instruments include 
diplomacy and treaties limiting or prohibiting specific weapons of mass destruction.  If 
these instruments fail to achieve the desired results, the employment of military forces 
may be necessary in some cases.  Military forces on the scene manifest the resolve of the 
United States and its allies.  Forward-deployed NATO naval forces can respond 
immediately while maintaining a defensive posture and protecting the Alliance as a whole. 
C.  MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES 
The Mediterranean region is divided by religious, ethnic, economic, and political 
differences.  As Western and Central Europe have become more stable in the aftermath of 
the Cold War, NATO and European leaders have focused attention on developments 
across the Mediterranean to resolve possible long-term problems.95  These long-term 
problems in the Mediterranean region stem in part from what Samuel Huntington has 
defined as a clash of civilizations.96  Future efforts by NATO and the European Union will 
therefore probably be concentrated in the southern and eastern periphery of the 
Mediterranean.  NATO forces, especially naval forces, have to adapt to the changing 
security environment in this region.  It is essential for NATO and the EU to prepare for all 
aspects of crisis response and peacekeeping operations, and to increase military 
cooperation among littoral countries so as to tailor specific forces to meet potential 
Mediterranean contingencies.     
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NATO and the European Union have devoted some time and energy to cultivating 
relations with Russia and other former Soviet republics since 1991, but they have given far 
more time and attention to the Balkans.  With NATO and EU involvement in Southeast 
Europe taking the center stage in the recent past, the importance of the Mediterranean 
region has slowly but surely increased for the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.  
The southern and eastern Mediterranean regions are particularly sensitive from a security 
viewpoint.  Previously known as an “arc of conflict” and a hotbed of tension, the 
Mediterranean region is now characterized “more by political upheaval and socio-
economic pressures, and by accompanying instability and tension.”97   
Many common strategic interests for the United States and its European allies are 
located along NATO’s southern and eastern flanks.  The Mediterranean contains the 
busiest shipping lanes in the world and therefore constitutes a strategic economic interest.  
More than 3,000 ships pass through the Mediterranean daily, and during the Gulf War 
ninety percent of the war supplies were transported through the Mediterranean. 98  This 
confirms the Mediterranean as a strategic military interest.  Several emerging security 
threats have surfaced and could have immediate and long-term effects on NATO and 
European security interests.  The ongoing United States-British confrontation with Iraq 
and its expanding WMD capabilities directly affect the security environment in the 
Mediterranean.  Economic problems and imbalances, the threat of terrorism, population 
expansion, and political violence among the countries of the region--plus southern 
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Europe’s dependence on energy and natural resources supplied by North African and 
Persian Gulf countries--bring great cause for concern and potential conflict.  All of these 
emerging and potential problems, including “socio-economic imbalances,” can have a 
direct impact on “soft security problems and on the vital interests and well-being of the 
European member countries of NATO.”99         
The North African population is expected to grow from approximately 63 million 
now to over 142 million by 2025.  During the same period, the population in the southern 
NATO European member states is expected to grow by only 5 million.  The disturbing 
aspect of this is that more than 30 percent of the Maghreb’s population will be under 15 
years old, and soon in need of employment—which promises to be scarce in the 
Maghreb.100  Due to the economic and demographic imbalances of the North African 
region, mass migrations from North Africa to southern European NATO countries are 
expected to take place.  The southern European NATO states may find it  hard to absorb 
the sudden influx, which could cause political disturbances.   
It is not known what could cause the next confrontation in the Mediterranean 
region, but the political, economic, religious, and social differences among the countries 
of the region (including southern European NATO countries) raise many questions as to 
how NATO and the EU will adapt to meet the evolving challenges.   
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With this in mind, NATO and the EU have dialogue initiatives in progress that 
address the growing security challenges in the Mediterranean. 101  NATO’s Mediterranean 
Initiative concentrates on information sharing and dialogue with six non-NATO countries 
of the Mediterranean region:  Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.  It 
also provides a framework that promotes confidence building among NATO nations.  The 
most important aspect is that it allows for practical cooperation among member nations as 
well as focusing greater attention on Mediterranean issues.  As the process and initiatives 
continue to evolve, a longer-term vision has to be developed that “reflects the Alliance’s 
view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the 
Mediterranean.”102  Cooperative development and  dialogue are essential in promoting 
stability in the Mediterranean region.  
D.  ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN STRATEGY 
The United States strategy for strengthening transatlantic security in the 21st 
century explains that, even though the Cold War is over, the Soviet Union dissolved, and 
former Warsaw Pact countries free, the bedrock underlying the European security 
architecture has not changed—NATO.103  It also lays out the means by which America 
intends to achieve its security objectives:  “enhancing security with present forces, 
bolstering economic interests abroad, promoting democracy globally, and protecting 
human rights and the rule of law.”104  With this in mind, the United States holds that it has 
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permanent and vital national interests in preserving and protecting the NATO alliance.  
According to a December 2000 report by the U.S. Department of Defense,  
A fundamental tenet of U.S. strategy is that NATO will continue to be the 
anchor of American engagement in Europe…In particular, the goals of 
improving NATO’s defense capabilities, strengthening the “European 
pillar” of the Alliance, and preparing for further enlargement of its 
membership are mutually supportive approaches to strengthening 
transatlantic security in the 21st century…To be an effective military 
alliance, NATO must fulfill certain key functions.  Specifically, it must 
understand the likely threats to the security of its members, decide on the 
capabilities needed to address those threats, and develop and field those 
capabilities through a combination of national and Alliance-wide efforts.105   
 
The U.S. strategy also holds that transatlantic security is indivisible, and that this 
transatlantic security should involve the EU.  The United States believes that the EU and 
NATO will again invite new members, and that this enlargement will be mutually 
beneficial. 106  The United States welcomes the efforts of the EU member nations to 
improve their collective defense and crisis response capabilities within the framework of 
NATO through ESDI.  Through ESDI, the eleven EU countries in NATO can best pursue 
their development of new weapons and information systems within the framework of 
NATO’s DCI.  The American strategy for achieving these mutually supportive objectives 
calls for global leadership and shared cooperative security responsibilities.  The United 
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States recognizes that it cannot, as Henry Kissinger stated, “remedy every wrong and 
stabilize every dislocation.”107  
NATO is the principal organization that helps shape the security environment 
within Europe and its periphery, including the Mediterranean.  The United States believes 
that for it to continue to prosper and to serve as a world leader it has to preserve the 
international economy, free market enterprise, and world peace and stability.  This  
requires continued U.S. engagement and influence in Europe with mutually supportive 
economic and security strategies.  This policy reflects an interpretation of the history of 
U.S. engagement in European security affairs.  The United States decided after World War 
II to learn from the mistakes it made after World War I.  The United States would no 
longer isolate itself from Europe.  Since 1949 United States involvement in European 
security affairs has been based on the North Atlantic Treaty.   
Today’s security architecture is no longer primarily focused on countering the 
threat of direct invasion of NATO territory.  NATO and the EU are focusing more on 
other types of threats, such as regional conflicts on the periphery of NATO (previously 
known as “out of area” operations), the proliferation of WMD, and terrorism, which could 
emanate from a variety of sources.108  NATO and EU forces and structures must have a 
multifaceted strategy in opposing any threat to achieve success.109  This strategy of 
adapting current military structures, organizations, and capabilities for the future is 
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paramount in tackling new risks.  NATO and the EU have to build security institutions 
that are mutually supportive to prevent future conflict, to deter aggression, to respond 
quickly and effectively to crisis situations, and to rebuild countries after hostilities have 
subsided.110  An overarching long-term strategy—including force structure and 
organizational adaptations--has to be implemented within the Atlantic Alliance.  These 
adaptations are needed to protect the member countries against regional conflicts on the 
periphery of NATO.   
The key elements of U.S. defense strategy worldwide are: 
- To shape the international security environment in ways that promote 
and protect U.S. national interests.   
- To respond, if necessary, to the full spectrum of crises, from deterring 
aggression or coercion and conducting smaller-scale contingency 
operations, to fighting and winning major theater wars.   
- To prepare now for an uncertain future through focused modernization 
efforts, pursuing the revolution in military affairs, and hedging against 
unlikely but significant future threats.   
In the Euro-Atlantic region, we pursue our shape, respond, and 
prepare strategy through three mutually reinforcing layers of engagement 
centered on NATO, multilateral engagement with countries participating 
in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and members of the EU, and 
bilateral engagement with individual Allies and Partners.  Within each 
layer of engagement, U.S. military forces stationed in Europe play a key 
role in advancing our security objectives.111  
    
By following the key elements of U.S. future defense strategy--shape, respond, and 
prepare--the Atlantic Alliance and the EU can promote international peace and stability 
and protect their shared interests.  These elements of United States defense strategy 
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embodied by NATO may be enhanced if the EU becomes stronger and cooperates closely 
with NATO.  A strengthened EU may enable NATO to become more politically balanced 
and militarily viable.  If the EU becomes stronger, the European allies and partners will be 
able to do more within NATO operations and bear a greater share of the military burden.               
Depending on its policies, a stronger and more capable European Union may be 
good for the transatlantic relationship.  Increased capabilities could provide the EU and 
NATO more flexibility in choosing a response to specific situations.112  A stronger 
European Union contributing to a stronger NATO is paramount to United States national 
interests; and for this reason, the United States continues to promote ESDI and DCI.  
Through ESDI and DCI the United States hopes to develop a closer working relationship 
with its European allies and partners while increasing its capabilities and flexibility to 
meet security challenges within the NATO framework.113   
E. CAPABILITIES AND INITIATIVES 
Improved European naval capabilities and the flexibility to meet emerging 
challenges have been pursued through the framework of ESDI within NATO and the 
ESDP concept within the EU.  The United States is eager to share the burden of military 
operations with the EU as long as it remains committed to increasing its capabilities and  
pursuing policies consistent with NATO objectives.  NATO military actions in Bosnia and 
Kosovo highlight the need for greater European capabilities in order for NATO European 
countries and the European Union to share more of the military burden with the United 
States.  The naval organizations and concepts of STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, 
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EUROMARFOR, and EMMF are mechanisms by which NATO and/or EU interests could 
be protected in the evolving security environment within Europe and beyond.    
NATO and the EU have evolved considerably since 1989.  NATO’s interventions  
in the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts have made it clear that developments beyond NATO’s 
borders could significantly affect the security interests of its members even in the absence 
of an Article 5 situation.  The growing gap between the U.S. and the EU in terms of their 
capabilities to project power and carry out the full range of Alliance military missions and 
operations was first highlighted during the Bosnia conflict and later more widely 
recognized during the Kosovo conflict.  The realization of the capabilities gap brought to 
the forefront Europe’s need for different and more advanced weapons systems not geared 
toward the Cold War environment but suited for the new security environment.  With the 
new security environment and reductions in the armed forces of most allies, NATO 
members realized the need for a transatlantic security relationship based on a fair and 
equitable sharing of responsibilities.  American and European interests lie within and 
outside of Europe.  With interests in the former Soviet Union, the Mediterranean, the  
Middle East and Southwest Asia, European security can be affected by situations in any of 
these regions.  Alliance forces and capabilities have to be able to meet the emerging 
challenges, non-Article 5 and Article 5, which affect the interests of the Allies.      
With ESDI initiatives and the DCI, Alliance members believe that the transatlantic 
link and NATO can be preserved and adapted to meet the emerging security challenges 
that NATO faces.  To help in this process, NATO’s maritime forces must continue to 
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work together in maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and incorporating 
technological advances into their warfare systems.  However, NATO European military 
and naval capabilities are unlikely to be substantially improved in the near future despite 
the political rhetoric employed by some European leaders.  In December 2000, Secretary 
of Defense William S. Cohen said that “NATO allies must pay more than lip service to the 
Defense Capabilities Initiative or the alliance stands in danger of becoming a relic.”114  
Cohen also declared that the United States would remain committed to European security 
because “it is a fundamental tenet of American foreign policy that the United States 
cannot be secure and prosperous unless Europe is secure and prosperous.”115  According 
to Jim Garamone, Cohen further explained that  
The United States would remain committed to the alliance and European 
security if the Europeans commit their resources to developing the 
capabilities outlined in the DCI...  These include more sealift, more airlift 
and more precision-guided munitions. It also calls for developing a better 
command and control apparatus.116 
 
Operations Deliberate Force in 1995 and Allied Force in 1999 revealed vast 
disparities in the military capabilities of European NATO members in relation to United 
States capabilities.  These operations showed that significant advances need to be made in 
European military and naval capabilities, including sealift, airlift, and precision-guided 
munitions, in order for NATO to remain an effective means to deal with emerging 
challenges.  NATO’s new security environment calls for forces to have the ability to meet 
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a broad range of challenges.  Naval forces are excellent examples of forces that are 
versatile enough to meet these challenges.   
During Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force, naval forces carried out 
multiple missions, including air defense suppression, power projection, embargo 
enforcement, intelligence, reconnaissance, and no-fly-zone enforcement.  Naval forces and 
their aggregate assets supported the land forces during both operations and continue to 
fulfill tasks associated with the peacekeeping operations under UN mandates.  The 
capability gap problems that are dividing the United States from its European allies began 
during the early periods of the Cold War.  “The Cold War scenario of a major NATO-
Warsaw Pact war called for most NATO European military establishments to ‘fight in 
place’ rather than to project troops or firepower at great distances.”117  As European 
NATO members prepared to “fight in place,” American forces prepared for trans-oceanic 
power projection and reinforcement of the European Allies.  For this reason, U.S. 
defensive strategy called for “improved fleets of large air-transport aircraft, air-to-air 
refueling tankers, carrier-battle groups, amphibious ships, and other mobility assets 
relevant to trans-oceanic power projection and expeditionary operations.”118  The previous 
decades of American preparation to project power ashore through extensive mobility 
assets and logistics support and the European Allies’ lack of a need for these assets 
became most explicitly manifest during and after Operation Allied Force.  The defense-
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capabilities gap between the United States and its European allies truly exists and does 
have implications for the future of the Alliance and European security.   
The United States ability to plan and conduct sustained theater-wide operations 
(including power projection, long-range precision strikes, transport, reconnaissance, 
intelligence, and logistics) far surpasses that of any European country. 119  Europe’s 
deficiencies in numerous key areas have to be addressed for a more balanced coalition of 
NATO members to take part in future multinational military operations.  To help ensure 
these deficiencies are addressed, the Venusberg Group recommended in June 2000 that the 
EU adopt as one of its goals the ability to “carry out a full Kosovo-type operation without 
recourse to U.S. assets” by 2015 and “a common defense by 2030.”120  At the April 1999 
Washington Summit, the Allies announced the DCI in the following terms: 
We have launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative to improve the defense 
capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of future 
multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in 
the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on 
improving interoperability among Alliance forces (and where applicable 
also between Alliance and Partner forces).  Defense capabilities will be 
increased through improvements in the deployability and mobility of 
Alliance forces, their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and 
effective engagement capability, and command and control and information 
systems.121 
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F.  CONCLUSIONS 
The DCI and the other new initiatives discussed above are intended to enable the 
member states of NATO and the EU to work together more closely in both military and 
political terms.  The naval elements within these initiatives embody key capabilities 
needed for the armed forces of the member nations of NATO and the EU to be effective in 
the future.  Leadership from the United States is needed for NATO and its European 
members to continue to advance militarily—especially in the maritime dimension. 
The development of naval capabilities in the EUOMARFOR organization and in 
the concept of EMMF reflect European aspirations to share a portion of the external 
security burden at times when a European force is deemed most appropriate.  Responses to 
regional security challenges, however, should not be tied to rhetoric but to far-sighted 
planning and action.  The post-Cold War NATO and EU decisions about responses to an 
unpredictable environment call for a multi- faceted approach involving a variety of 
participating allies and their forces.  For many of the emergent challenges today, an 
appropriate way to respond would be through the versatility of more flexible, mobile, and 
diverse naval forces that are ready to operate with multinational forces on a local, regional, 





























This thesis has shown that since 1989 the unpredictable and evolving security 
environment has been a key concern for the United States, NATO, and the European 
Union.  The future security environment is difficult to forecast because it is beset with 
problems such as demographic imbalances, environmental and social change, and the 
tensions between prosperous and developing nations.122  The increasing interdependence 
and multiple interactions among nations throughout the world mean that few nations or 
political groups can be completely isolated from evolving crisis situations.   
Future conflicts among nations are likely when they compete for economic 
advantage and access to limited natural resources.  As three analysts at the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently concluded, “the free flow of commerce 
increasingly depends not only on free access to the world’s seas, but also to space and the 
electromagnetic spectrum.”123  To be prepared for unpredictable threats and risks, the 
United States, NATO, and the EU have to realize that flexible military forces must be 
available to meet evolving security situations.  The most adaptable forces capable of 
responding on short notice to the likely scenarios are maritime forces.  For this reason, 
naval organizations such as STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, and EUROMARFOR and the 
concept of an EMMF are among the forces that must be earmarked to meet emerging 
security threats.              
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A.  ADVANTAGES AND IMPLICATIONS 
STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, EUROMARFOR, and EMMF are naval 
mechanisms designed to meet the emerging security challenges, Article 5 or non-Article 5, 
within and beyond NATO and EU borders.    NATO’s new roles have called for United 
States and European allied naval components and organizations to perform combat and 
standing tasks of long duration before, during, and after Operation Deliberate Force in the 
Bosnia conflict (1995) and Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo conflict (1999).  These 
tasks have included intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; embargo enfo rcement; 
no-fly-zone enforcement; and reinforcement and preparedness for possible extraction of 
peacekeeping forces.  In carrying out these operations and tasks, allied naval capability 
shortfalls have surfaced in the fields of interoperability, power projection, strategic lift, 
reconnaissance, and littoral-based operations.  These capabilities need to be improved for 
future naval operations.   
STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, EUROMARFOR, and EMMF are organizations 
and concepts intended to facilitate better resource sharing among the participating NATO 
and EU countries.  The EU countries have expressed an interest in improving their ability 
to undertake some non-Article 5 missions (called ”Petersberg Tasks” in the EU) directly 
related to the interests of the European Union with little help from the United States or 
without direct United States involvement in the future.  These developments promote the 
construction of an ESDI within NATO while also helping to satisfy a United States desire 
to share the global security burden with European allies.   As Javier Solana, then the 
NATO Secretary General, stated in his November 1996 speech in Lisbon, 
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We cannot predict all possible contingencies, and we should not tie 
ourselves to one organizational response.  Sharing the European security 
burden with the United States means that we should not expect the US to 
lead every action or contribute significantly to every operation.  There may 
be times when a European-led force would be appropriate…  Another point 
that should be clear is that we do not want an Alliance within an Alliance.  
The ESDI is not a grouping, but a potential within NATO…  It is clear that 
NATO will remain the ultimate guarantor of security.  It can combine and 
coordinate the Allies’ aim to strengthen stability throughout the continent.  
The more that Europeans can do this with the United States, the more 
successful we will be.124                 
 
B.  FURTHER ADAPTATIONS 
Organizations such as STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, and EUROMARFOR (and 
the EMMF concept) are necessary means of adaptation to new security requirements.  
They are designed to respond to Article 5 and non-Article 5 situations.  As NATO and the 
EU expand their borders and influence, there is no shortage of potential conflicts or crisis 
situations that could occur within or beyond their borders.  Tensions within Europe, the 
Maghreb, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia create instability.  United States and 
European values, prosperity, and influence are dependent on stability and economic 
progress in these regions.  The citizens of the NATO and EU nations need to be confident 
that their military and political organizations are capable of delivering security.  For the 
most part, today’s security environment calls for multinational political-military actions 
instead of unilateral national actions.  The need for multinational forces to oppose 
aggression derives from the fact that there is no real single immediate threat to Western 
interests as there was during the Cold War.  The diversity of the challenges at hand has 
brought a greater need for collective security interventions rather than collective defense.  
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Although collective defense is the basis for NATO and should remain the ultimate 
function of the Atlantic Alliance, the unpredictable and diverse threats should be met with 
adaptable and flexible forces with capabilities diverse enough to meet any crisis situation.  
STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, and  EUROMARFOR (and the EMMF concept) 
encompass key naval forces that have made adaptations in order to focus on and meet the 
new threats of the post-Cold War period since 1989.  NATO and the EU have taken many 
initiatives to increase military capabilities and create forces ready to meet the emerging 
challenges of the future.  Unfortunately, the EU’s headline goal and NATO’s DCI have 
primarily concentrated on land forces for peacekeeping operations and given little explicit 
attention to naval capabilities.  This is regrettable because maritime forces with the general 
characteristics endorsed by NATO and the EU—sustainability, deployability, and 
effective engagement—are needed in order for the land components to be sustained, 
maneuvered, protected, and possibly extracted in an emergency.  As well- informed 
analysts have pointed out, “With the advent of ad hoc coalitions, it cannot be assumed that 
prospective allies will provide base access.  Evidence of this can already be seen in 
Greece’s refusal to provide bases during Operation Allied Force and the denial of base 
access for strike operations by Saudi Arabia and Turkey during Operation Desert Fox.”125  
Where no basing structures exist, naval forces such as STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, 
and  EUROMARFOR (and the EMMF concept) will play important roles in carrying out 
coalition or multinational operations in the littoral.              
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With much of Europe, the Maghreb, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia 
accessible by sea, NATO and the EU must define a maritime military posture ready for the 
emerging security environment.  Naval forces with the ability to intervene immediately 
can influence foreign decision-makers and, if necessary, employ force or conduct other 
operations to satisfy their objectives.  As the STRIKFORSOUTH campaign plan points 
out,  
Maritime forces possess two primary attributes that make them well suited 
for the rapid response nature of the Alliance’s security and military 
strategies:  flexibility and self-sufficiency…Sea-based forces can rapidly 
marshal once nations transfer authority providing an expression of alliance 
resolve while allowing alliance consensus building to craft a more 
comprehensive strategy for crisis termination. 126   
 
Naval organizations such as STRIKFORSOUTH, EUROMARFOR, and CAFMED can 
perform critical missions of power projection, presence, and sustainment while 
maintaining the capability to respond to a variety of evolving mission requirements.   
C.  CONCLUSIONS 
United States influence in Europe is based on many factors, including America’s 
economic strength, technological capacities, social cohesion, and cultural achievements.  
Washington’s influence also reflects the reality that American capabilities in the field of 
satellite and remote observation, intelligence gathering, command, control, 
communications, transport, logistics, nuclear deterrence, power projection, and strike 
capabilities are unmatched by any European ally—or indeed any combination of European 
allies.  The European Union will not be able to narrow the military capabilities gap with 
the United States and thereby diminish its dependence on the United States without 
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substantial effort and cost.  The EU countries seem unwilling to spend those resources and 
will have to balance the transatlantic relationship by political and economic means.  
NATO remains as relevant today as it has ever been because its members work together to 
bring their combined energy to bear in shaping the European security environment.  
“NATO’s key strategic objective is to help create political conditions which make crises 
and conflicts less and less likely.”127  For example, during the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia NATO created security arrangements with non-NATO countries to contain the 
conflict and prevent a wider war.   
NATO’s new command structures, concepts such as EMMF, and organizations 
such as EUROMARFOR, STRIKFORSOUTH, and CAFMED are among the 
developments that will answer the future operational questions for NATO’s multinational 
operations, including Article 5 and non-Article 5 challenges.  These naval organizational 
and conceptual adaptations, including those made within the framework of ESDI, are 
intended to strengthen NATO and the EU and to enhance their ability to act within the 
immediate European area and beyond.  These naval organizations and concepts must 
continue to develop mutually supportive and complementary capabilities while adapting to 
the changing international security environment in order to sustain the West’s naval 
superiority.        
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